Despite extensive researches on efficiency of family firms in normal or good economic times, we know rather little about whether family firms are superior performers in recession times. Using a dataset covering firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) during the period 2006-2010, I give empirical evidences examining the performance of family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms during the current financial crisis. I find that broadly defined family firms, comprising 35 percent of the sample, do not outperform non-family firms during the crisis whether I use market performance measure (Tobin's Q) or accounting performance measure (Operating Return on Assets (OROA)). However, family firms with founder presence (as CEO, a board member or a significant blockholder) outperform by 18 percent relative to non-family firms in OROA. Tobin's Q of founder firms, by contrast, does not exhibit difference significantly. I interpret the attenuation of founder firms' market value premium as the result of high volatility of stock prices and investors' overreaction during the crisis (Veronesi, 1999; Glode et al., 2010). Further testing shows that in the crisis, compared with non-family firms, founder firms have less administrative costs incurred. Moreover, they invest significantly less and have better access to credit market. All these findings contribute to superior accounting performance of founder firms during the crisis. My results suggest that in the financial crisis, founder firms bear the least agency cost and Tobin's Q is not a good measure of corporate performance.
Introduction
That family firms constitute a large proportion of national economies around the world is undeniable ( for instance, La Porta et al. for overall outlook, 1999; Anderson and Reeb in the US, 2003; Klein in Germany, 2000; Morck and Yeung in Sweden, 2003; Bennedsen et al. in Denmark, 2007; Claessens et al. in Eastern Asia, 2000) . The prevalence of family firms gives rise to the question whether family firms are a more efficient organizational form. Earlier empirical studies have contradicted findings. In US public firms, for example, while Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family firms have a lower Tobin's Q than non-family firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report the opposite findings. Empirical evidences in other countries are mixed and inconclusive (McConaughy et. al., 1998; Morck et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003) .
More recent researches tend to render a conclusion that family firms' outperformance is sensitive to the definitions of family firms (for instance, Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 2007) and the founders of family firms play a central role in differentiating family firms from their counterparts in corporate performance. Active involvement of founders in top management (CEO) and monitoring as directors in boards is associated with superior corporate performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007) .
Almost all existent literatures, however, only focus on the corporate performance comparison between family firms and non-family firms in normal economic times or good market conditions. Studies are rather scant about what the performance comparison will be during depression or recession ages. Performance examination between family and non-family firms in difficult economic times matters because it offers a comprehensive picture of firm performance in distinct economic backgrounds. In bad days, demand cuts from customers and credit constraints (especially for those firms which largely rely on debt financing) from financial institutions may amplify intrinsic organizational fragility, which will be reflected in corporate performance.
Therefore, a superior organization, despite its performance premium during good days, is more likely to build a sturdier and stabler profile relative to an inferior organization in bad days.
The current financial crisis since 2008 gives us an experimental opportunity of making such a study empirically. Using a detailed dataset from proxy filings of firms from S&P 500 (US), In this paper, I pose two research questions. The primary concern is to explore whether family firms outperform non-family firms during the current financial crisis. I find that broadly defined family firms, comprising 35 percent of the sample firms, do not significantly outperform non-family firms during the crisis whether I use market performance measure (Tobin's Q) or accounting performance measure (Operating Return on Assets (OROA)). However, family firms with founder presence (as CEO, a board member or a significant blockholder) show significant higher accounting performance by 18 percent relative to non-family firms during the crisis.
Market performance of founder firms, by contrast, does not exhibit difference significantly.
Next, I explore the reasons for different findings of founder firms in accounting performance measure and market performance measure. On one hand, OROA computes yearly cash flow over the book value of total assets of a firm, which is less likely to be affected by stock prices. My results evidence that during the crisis, compared with non-family firms, founder firms have less administrative costs incurred. Moreover, they invest significantly less and have better access to credit market. All these findings explain the superior accounting performance of founder firms during the crisis.
On the other hand, market performance is measured as Tobin's Q, which is mainly driven by market price of stocks. High volatility of stock prices features as one characteristic of recession times (Veronesi, 1999) . In addition, investors are apt to be irrational and to overreact to bad market conditions during recession times (Glode et al., 2010) . As a result, high volatility and investors' overreaction may attenuate value premium of founder firms, which enjoy higher market values prior to the crisis comes.
My empirical evidences suggest that founder firms bear the least agency cost compared with other firms during the financial crisis. My results also suggest that during the crisis, when inventors tend to be irrational and stock price volatility is high, Tobin's Q is not a good measure of corporate performance.
The remainder of my paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of related literature. In Section 3, I describe data and variables. In Section 4, I show my empirical findings with discussions and explanations in Section 5. Finally, I conclude in Section 6.
Family firms, founder value and financial crisis
Family firms have been receiving more attentions from academia, policy makers and practioners for at least two reasons: First, family firms prevail in national economy the world around. In US, for example, family firms comprise one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding shares of capital market (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) . Second, family firms, with ownership concentration in most cases, are a good subject for empirically testing various theories like agency theory (Berle and Mean, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The key question of family firm research is whether family firms are an effective organizational structure to deliver superior performance relative to non-family firms and what characteristics of family firms determine the performance. Earlier literatures have mixed and inconclusive results regarding this question (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; McConaughy et al.,1998; Morck et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003) .
Current literatures in family business turn to more fine-grained classifications of family firms to reconcile conflicting evidences and tend to agree that performance examination is sensitive to different definitions of family firms (Maury, 2006) . Family firms with active founder involvement as CEO or board members predict firm outperformance. Villalongaa and Amit (2006) show that family ownership can gain value only when the founder acts as CEO of the family business or as the Chairman of the board. Similarly, Miller et al. (2007) performance and report that founder-CEOs are more likely to step down from CEO position after periods of either unusually low or unusually high operating performances. These researches suggest a positive view of founder value and the necessity of a more fine-grained family firm classification when conducting family business researches.
Although a host of literatures center on performance examination of family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms in normal economic times or good market conditions, studies are almost missing about what the performance will be during depression or recession ages. The current global financial crisis gives us an opportunity of addressing this problem. The extreme market condition (both financial market and product market) during the crisis is more likely amplify various factors that drive the performance of family business, making it unclear whether family firms handle an exogenous financial crisis better on the balance of costs and benefits of family ownership, management and control.
On one hand, asset expropriation of minor shareholders by powerful controlling family shareholder might be more severe during the crisis, which implies that family firms might underperform. Unlike small diversified shareholders, who use market value rules to decide investments that maximize the value of the firms, large family shareholders, may derive greater private benefits from pursuing different investments, excessive compensations, and special dividends given their slumping capital incomes in the crisis (Fama and Jensen, 1985; Andersen and Reeb, 2003) . Baek et al. (2003) document that chaebol firms with concentrated shareholding by controlling families have a larger drop in their equity value during 1997 Korea financial crisis.
Firms with disproportionate ownership structure (voting rights exceed cash flow rights) also experience lower returns. In addition, family entrenchment and nepotism during the crisis may also hit firm values. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that one big cost of concentrated family ownership is from remaining unqualified family members to run the firm. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2008) evidence the performance drop of family succession, suggesting high costs of nepotism and unqualified family CEOs. During the crisis, when market conditions are harsh, unqualified management may bring more costs to family firms. Using a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries during Eastern Asian financial crisis, Lemmon and Lins (2003) show a significant lower value of firms with entrenchment managers by 10-20 percent relative to other firms 1 On the other hand, however, superior performance of family firms might arise from the better alignment of interests between shareholders and managers in family firms (Andersen and Reeb, 2003) . Interest conflict between long-term oriented owners and short-term oriented managers is highly costly when a crisis comes. For example, it is well known that managers have the incentive to take excessive risky projects when firm is close to bankruptcy because they get the upside gain of the excess risk but lose nothing from the downside failure. In the crisis, the probability of this situation is high. Moreover, myopic managers may over-invest in projects to boost current performance given the falling sales during the crisis. This is highly risky when financial instruments of the firms are not rich. Dry-out of short term loan from banks with increasingly stringent lending policy might plague ongoing projects. Family firms with large shareholders as managers have no such problem. Villalongaa and Amit (2006) document that founder-CEO firms, free from owner-manager conflict of interests, have the highest Torbin's Q among different types of family firms they have categorized. Another source of outperformance during the crisis might be reputation concerns of family owners with long term commitment to family firms. Chen et al. (2010) find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-. 1 Asian firms are known for bad Corporate Governance with weak legal protection of investors. Although Baek et al. (2003) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) give evidences of family ownership performance of Asian countries in local financial crisis in 1997, it is doubtable whether these results can apply to firms in Western countries with better Corporate Governance mechanisms and institutional environment. family counterparts. They interpret the findings as family owners' willingness to forgo tax benefits to avoid the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit. They also find that firms in need of external capital would exhibit even lower tax aggressiveness. Andersen and Reeb (2003) argue that banks or other financial institutions are more likely to deal with the same governing entities and practices like those in family firms with reputation concerns than in nonfamily firms. During the crisis, when most firms encounter credit constraints, the established relationship with financial institutions could enhance operating performance of firms that do not forgo good investments because of financing problem.
To sum up, whether family firms outperform non-family firms in the financial crisis remains an open empirical question. In the following section, I will provide empirical evidences to investigate this question. My data collection process comprises three main phrases. In the first phrase, I compile a dataset to identify blockholders (big shareholders with at least 5 percent of outstanding shares), and board members and top management for each sample firm. I later the dataset use to define family firms. The source of the ownership and board data is Bureau van Dijk Orbis, which covers as many as 78.4 million private and public firms (in 2011) all over the world. It gives me historical ownership structure and information of board members and top managers of the sample firms each year.
In the second phrase, I manually collect information on founding history of each firm from the following sources: (1) company official website; (2) Hoover's; and (3) web search about firm history and family running history. I use the collected information to identify founders, founding families and family member relationships and further to define family firms.
The last phrase is to merge the information from the first two phrases with accounting data from COMPUSTAT and other firm characteristic data (firm age data are from Bureau van Dijk Orbis, and market value and stock return data are from Datastream). Table 1 describes the definitions of all variables in my research.
[Inset Table 1 here]
Definitions of different types of family firms
A key challenge for any analysis regarding family firms is the lack of a widely accepted of what a family firm is (Bennedsen et al., 2010) . Previous work has shown that the results of empirical studies are highly sensitive to the choice of the family firm definition (Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 2007) . Taking 
Measure of firm performance
Following earlier studies, I mean to investigate both market performance and accounting performance of family versus non-family firms during the financial crisis. I use Tobin's Q as the market performance measure and interpret it as a measure of firm value. In my setting, Tobin's Q is calculated as market value of equity at the end of fiscal year plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year. Market value of equity is from Datastream, and book values of total assets and equity are from COMPUSTAT. I use Operating Retunes on Assets (OROA) as accounting performance measure. It is Earnings before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Both EBIT and the book value of total assets are from COMPUSTAT.
OROA is a natural measure of firm performance because it acts as a comprehensive proxy for a firm's cash flow before interest and taxes relative to its book asset, the earning generator (Bennedsen et al., 2007) . Unlike net income-based measure like Return on Assets (ROA), it is unaffected by the variation of capital structure, which determines corporate tax base. Unlike return on equity (ROE), it captures total assets rather than part of it. Table 2 shows SIC 2-digit industry distribution of the sample firms. Because the main findings of this paper centers on family firms and founder firms, I focus on family firms (column 4), founder firms (column 5) and non-family firms (column 6) in this table. Although family firms are prevalent in economy, they are not symmetrically distributed in every industry.
Descriptive statistics
Villalonga and Amit (2006) report family firms are not present in 13 SIC industries, while they are over-represent in some industries. In the sample, I find 11 SIC 2-digit industries are free of family firms. My results of industry representation of family firms are comparable to the findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) . In addition, founder firms are concentrated in the industries like electronic and other electrical equipment (SIC 2-digit code: 36) and business service (SIC 2-digit code: 73). These results imply that control industries matters to econometric analysis.
[Insert Table 2 all the other non-founder family firms: heir firms, family-owned firms and leader/owner firms do not exhibit performance superiority relative to non-family firms in both OROA and Tobin's Q.
These findings are consistent with those of Miller et al. (2007) , suggesting founder firms' value premium. In the next section, I will use multivariate regressions to analyze the performance difference between family firms and non-family firms in a 5 year panel framework, which spans the period before and during crisis, controlling for country, industry, and firm specific characteristics.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Do family firms outperform non-family firms in the financial crisis?
The principal objective of this paper is to examine whether family firms outperform nonfamily firms during financial crisis, and investigate the reason for the possible outperformance.
In this section, I will use several methods to show the main empirical results and to answer the former question.
Univariate difference in difference analysis
I start my analysis with univariate difference in difference test of OROA, and Tobin's Q.
Again, I list the 2 performance measures of non-family firms, family firms and founder firms side by side around crisis year in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 here] My first step focuses on comparison between all family firms and non-family firms. I find that both accounting performance and market performance measures are not significantly different expect for tow-year-mean of Tobin's Q before crisis (2006) (2007) . The performance change across crisis for family firms and non-family firms are similar. These results imply that my broadly defined family firm group is not superior performers during financial crisis.
Next, I center on the comparison between founder firms and non-family firms. With respect to accounting performance OROA, the first striking result is that even in crisis, founder firms'
OROA does not drop significantly compare with before crisis performance. To be specific, threeyear-mean of OROA before crisis is 0.116 versus 0.111 for two-year-mean during crisis. By contrast, non-family firms during crisis have a profitability shrink by 14 percent, while all family firms 12 percent. Additionally, founder firms significantly outperform non-family firms during crisis by 16 percent, and the performance change across crisis years is also significantly different at 10 percent level. The findings provide the first evidence of founder firms' outperformance during crisis.
The picture of Tobin's Q is somehow different. Although founder firms significantly outperform non-family firms both before and during crisis, the magnitude of outperformance decreases when the crisis shocks firms. Prior to the crisis, founder firms outperform non-family firms by 0.607 in Tobin's Q. During the crisis, however, founder firms only outperform by 0.380, which suggests that the financial crisis attenuates market value premium of founder firms. I notice that in the case of accounting performance OROA, the crisis tends to amplify the performance difference between founder firms and non-family firms from 0.005 (before the crisis) to 0.015 (during the crisis). The difference of OROA and Tobin's Q in magnitude change implies that the financial crisis may have a disparate effect on corporate cash flow based performance and market value based performance. I would use multivariate regressions to scrutinize the difference in the next section. Return volatility the proxy for firm risk, calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the last 36 months. Capital structure is the ratio of debt to total assets. Investment is the capital expenditure over plant, property and equipment (PPE) at the end of last fiscal year. I also include firm age, and natural logarithm of employee number. Table 5 illustrates that after controlling for firm fixed effect, and time-variant firm specific characteristics, family firms, as broadly defined in the sample, do not significantly outperform non-family firms during the crisis. The insignificance is similar whether I use OROA or Tobin's Q as performance measure and consistent with early univariate analysis.
Firm fixed effect estimation
[Insert Table 5 here]
Next, I split family firms into 4 subgroups and involve 4 dummies in the fixed effect model. I aim to examine whether different groups perform differently during the crisis. The model I use is as follows: These results complement the works of Andersen and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Maury (2006), and Miller et al. (2007) by providing new evidence suggesting that in recession times, market value premium of founder firms disappears, whereas accounting performance premium displays.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Endogeneity of founder status and other robustness tests
Although fixed effect estimation controls for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity, time-variant heterogeneity may bias the estimates. Founder status is not randomly assigned to sample firms. I am unable to indentify an unbiased and consistent estimator, given underlying omitted determinants of selection into founder firms are correlated to outcome performances.
Following Maury (2006) In Table 7 , the first-stage regression shows that founder firms are negatively related to Old firms, while positively related to US dummy and Ln cash, implying the legitimacy of instruments.
In the second stage treatment regression, the coefficient of Founder is 0.047, significant at 5 percent level. The finding is consistent with that of former fixed effect model. The lambda statistic is statistically significant at 10 percent level, supporting existence of selection bias.
Taken together, Heckman's model confirms founder firms' outperformance during the crisis.
[Insert Table 7 here]
As an alternative robustness test, I exclude financial firms from my sample and re-run firm fixed effect regressions. The results are consistent with those of full sample. The magnitude of coefficients highly resembles that from full sample fixed effect model(Please refer to Appendix 4 for details).
I conclude this section by stating that when the financial crisis comes, broadly defined family firms are not superior performers. However, founder firms outperform during the crisis in terms of accounting measure OROA. Interestingly, market value premium of founder firms, which is widely documented in normal or good economic times in earlier studies, disappears. I will explain the phenomena in the next section.
Why do founder firms outperform in accounting profitability, not in market valuation?
I start to explain the different performance of founder firms with respect to OROA and Tobin's Q during the financial crisis by analyzing the different algorithms of these two measures.
OROA is a period cash flow divided by the book value of total assets at the end of a fiscal year.
Therefore, it is a revenue based profitability measure driven by business strategy, operating efficiency, management skills, expense control and other firm level characteristics. On the contrary, Tobin's Q is computed as market value over book value of total assets. Because book value of a firm is persistent, Tobin's Q is mainly driven by market price of stocks (I use book value of total liability of debt plus market value of stocks as a proxy for market value of total assets). A large body of financial literature documents high volatility of stocker returns in recession times (for example, Veronesi, 1999). Table 8 clearly evidences that during the crisis, volatility of monthly returns is as high as 12 percent, while only 6 percent in normal times.
Economists tend to attribute high volatility to investors' uncertainty about the future growth of economy in bad times. In addition, investors are prone to be irrational and they overreact to bad market conditions during recessions (Glode et al., 2010) . In my context, I argue that in the recent financial crisis, high volatility tends to attenuate value premium of founder firms given investors' overreaction to bad market conditions and undervaluing stock prices. Univariate difference in difference analysis in Table 4 also supports my argument. Before crisis, market value premium of founder firms is 0.607 and during crisis, it declines to 0.380 by 35 percent.
Moreover, market value drop before and during the crisis is 0.449 for non-family firms versus 0.664 for founder firms. Return volatility for founder firms in the crisis year 2008 is 0.112, significantly higher than non-family firms (0.098) in Table 3 . I therefore ascribe founder firm value premium vanishing to investors' irrational overreaction to bad market conditions and high volatility during recession times.
Next, I explain the reasons for accounting performance premium for founder firms during the crisis. I split OROA into 4 components according to the calculation formula:
OROA= EBIT/total assets=Sales/total assets -Costs of goods/total assets -Admin expense/total assets -Depreciation and Amortization/total assets.
[Insert Table 9 here] I use firm fixed effect model similar to model (2) to examine which component (s) contribute(s) the performance premium of founder firms during the crisis. The results in Table 9 show that among 4 components, only expense/total assets of founder firms is significantly lower during the crisis at 10 percent level. This suggests that founder firms do a better job in administrative expense control in the crisis, which results in a net profit premium. Previous studies (Morck et al., 1988 (Morck et al., , 2000 Fahlenbrach, 2005, etc.) . Table 10 presents the results.
I find that founder firms invest significantly less (at 5 percent level) relative to non-family firms in the crisis. At the same time, however, founder firms have gained more short term loan and aggregate level of debt is higher than non-family firms. The coefficients of Founder*crisis_acc in both regressions mean (column 2 and 3) that on average, founder firms during the crisis have a bigger increment of short term debt by 431 mil US dollars relative to non-family firms and their capital structure is more leveraged by 0.8 relative to non-family firms.
Recall that in Table 3 descriptive statistics, before crisis 9 founder firms are less leveraged and invest more relative to non-family firms. The coefficients indicate that founder firms substantially change their investment and financial strategy during the crisis. I also find that cash flow and working capital of founder firms are similar to those of non-family firms
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In summary, I argue that during the financial crisis, founder firms have a better control of expense and make a more conservative investment strategy even though they may get better access to credit market than their counterparts. All these findings explain the superior accounting performance of founder firms. By contrast, because market performance are mainly driven by stock prices, high volatility of stock returns and investors' overreaction to bad market conditions during the crisis may dilute market value premium of founder firms.
. If I assume that more short term debt means better access to credit market, the fact of founder firms raise their debt level during the crisis suggests that founders firms have more financing resources than non-family firms in bad time, when financial institutions tighten credit granting. I do not want draw too strong conclusion that it is the founders who play a pivotal role in abundant debt access.
But the association between founder firms and higher leverage during the crisis may imply extra skills and resources related to the founders.
Concluding remarks
It is the prevalence of family firms all over the world that makes academics pay increasing attention to family business researches. One central issue is to examine whether family firms are a superior organizational structure. Although a growing body of literature has made rigorous performance analyses between family firms and non-family firms in normal or good economic times, rather scant papers try to investigate the topic in recession times. This paper attempts to fill this knowledge void.
Constructing a detailed dataset from proxy filings of firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 Further testing shows that during the crisis, relative to non-family firms, founder firms have less administrative costs incurred. Moreover, they invest significantly less and have better access to credit market. All these findings determine the superior accounting performance of founder firms during the crisis.
Taken as a whole, my results support widely-documented "founder premium" (for instance, Morck et al., 1988 Morck et al., , 2000 Fahlenbrach, 2004 Ratio of sales to the book value of total assets. Expense/asset Ratio of selling, general administrative expense to the book value of total assets. Cost/asset Ratio of costs of goods to the book value of total assets. Depreciation/asset Ratio of depreciation and amortization to the book value of total assets. Number and percent of firms by primary two-digit SIC code. Family firms are defined as the sum of all the four subgroups of firms: (1) founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. This table reports means, standard deviations, and tests between means of non-family firms, family firms, and founder firms in 2008. Family firms are defined as the sum of all the four subgroups of firms: (1) founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Non-family firms are all remaining sample firms that do not fulfill my criteria of family firms. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. ROA is net income divided by the book value of total assets. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Working capital growth is yearly working capital growth rate, defined as increment of yearly working capital divided by working capital of last fiscal year. Short debt change is yearly short term debt increment, defined as the difference between short term debt this fiscal year and last fiscal year, measured in 1 billion US dollars. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. Ln cash is the natural logarithm of cash. Sales/asset is ratio of sales to the book value of total assets. Expense/asset is ratio of selling, general administrative expense to the book value of total assets. Cost/asset is ratio of costs of goods to the book value of total assets. Depreciation/asset is ratio of depreciation and amortization to the book value of total assets. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. 2008, 2009 and 2010 . This variable indicates the years when financial crisis significantly strikes the financial market. Family is a dummy variable, which is one if the sample firm is a family firm. Family firms are the sum of all the four subgroups of firms: (1) founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) family-owned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir is a dummy which equals one if a firm is heir firm. Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family_owned is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a family-owned firm. Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader_owner is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a Leader/owner firm. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. This table reports results of Heckman two step regression of firm performance before and during the financial crisis on founder dummy. Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir is a dummy which equals one if a firm is heir firm. Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family_owned is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a family-owned firm. Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader_owner is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a Leader/owner firm. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Difference in OROA is the difference between average OROA of the period 2009-2010 and average OROA of the period 2006-2008.OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Old firm is a dummy variable, which is one if the sample firm is incorporated before 1960. US is a dummy variable, which is one if the headquarter of a sample firm is in the US. Sale growth rate is yearly sales growth rate, defined as increment of yearly total sales divided by total sales of last fiscal year Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. Crisis_acc. Crisis_acc is a dummy which is one if the fiscal year is 2009 and 2010. This variable indicates the years when financial crisis significantly strikes real economy. Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir is a dummy which equals one if a firm is heir firm. Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family_owned is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a familyowned firm. Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader_owner is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a Leader/owner firm. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Sales/asset is ratio of sales to the book value of total assets. Expense/asset is ratio of selling, general administrative expense to the book value of total assets. Cost/asset is ratio of costs of goods to the book value of total assets. Depreciation/asset is ratio of depreciation and amortization to the book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively. Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir is a dummy which equals one if a firm is heir firm. Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family_owned is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a familyowned firm. Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader_owner is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a Leader/owner firm. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Short debt change is yearly short term debt increment, defined as the difference between short term debt this fiscal year and last fiscal year, measured in 1 billion US dollars. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Ln cash is the natural logarithm of cash. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Profitability is Operating Return on Assets of last fiscal year. Tangibility is tangible assets divided by the book values of total assets. Dividend payout is dividend divided by sales. Non-debt tax shield is depreciation and amortization divided by the book value of total assets. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. (1) founder firms; (2) heir firms; (3) familyowned firms; and (4) Leader/owner firms. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. ROA is net income divided by the book value of total assets. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Working capital growth is yearly working capital growth rate, defined as increment of yearly working capital divided by working capital of last fiscal year. Short debt change is yearly short term debt increment, defined as the difference between short term debt this fiscal year and last fiscal year, measured in 1 billion US dollars. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. Ln cash is the natural logarithm of cash. Sales/asset is ratio of sales to the book value of total assets. Expense/asset is ratio of selling, general administrative expense to the book value of total assets. Cost/asset is ratio of costs of goods to the book value of total assets. Depreciation/asset is ratio of depreciation and amortization to the book value of total assets. The sample comprises 658 firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively.
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Appendix 4 Fixed effect estimation of founder firms outperformance in OROA during the crisis (non-financial firms) Founder is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a founder firm. Founder firms are firms where the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Heir is a dummy which equals one if a firm is heir firm. Heir firms are firms where the heir/heirs (by blood or by marriage) of the founder/founders of the firm holds/hold a position either as a board member, or CEO, or a blockholder (at least 5 percent share holding). Family_owned is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a family-owned firm. Family-owned firms are firms where one individual or several members from the same family together hold more than 10 percent of outstanding shares either directly or indirectly through another family firm or fund which the individual or the family controls or owns. Leader_owner is a dummy which equals one if a firm is a Leader/owner firm. Leader/owner firms are firms where the CEO or a board member is simultaneously a significant shareholder with an outstanding ownership stake of at least 5 percent. OROA is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book values of total assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity plus book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of a firm. Capital structure is the book value of total liability (book value of total asset -book value of equity) divided by the book value of total equity. Investment is capital expenditure divided by the PPE of last fiscal year. Ln employee is natural logarithm of the number of employees the firm. Advertising is yearly advertising expense divided by sales. Research is yearly research and development expense divided by sales. Firm age is the difference between incorporation year and a fiscal year. Return volatility is firm idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 36 months. The sample comprises 542 non-financial firms from S&P 500 (US), FTE100 (UK), DAX 30 (Germany), CAC 40 (France) and FTSE MIB 40 (Italy) in the 2011 index company lists. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent level (***) respectively.
